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Abstract: We use annual variations in rainfall to examine the effects 
that exogenous, transitory income shocks have on remittances in a 
panel of 41 Sub-Saharan African countries during the period 1970-
2007. Our main finding is that on average rainfall shocks have an 
insignificant contemporaneous effect on remittances. However, the 
marginal effect is significantly decreasing in the share of domestic 
credit to GDP. So much so, that at high levels of credit to GDP 
rainfall shocks have a significant negative effect on remittances, 
while at low levels of credit to GDP the effect of rainfall on 
remittances is significantly positive. 
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For many developing countries and most importantly for Sub-Saharan African countries, remittances 
constitute a significant source of foreign exchange and income. According to the World Bank, “tens of 
millions of African migrants scattered around the world could mobilize more than $100 billion a year 
to help develop the impoverished continent”. The World Bank says “there's around $40 billion a year in 
officially recorded remittances -- cash sent by migrants back to their home countries -- and an 
estimated $50 billion in diaspora savings that could be leveraged for low-cost project finance”.
1 Given 
the economic significance of remittances to the developing world, the causes of remittances to these 
countries is an issue of key importance for both academics who study the determinants of economic 
growth in the developing world and economic policy makers. In particular, for the economic policy 
response to transitory income shocks it is key to understand whether the response of remittances to 
transitory income shocks is positive, negative, or zero. 
Obtaining an estimate of the causal effect that transitory income shocks have on remittances is 
complicated by a possible reverse causal effect of remittances on income. Remittances may have a 
positive effect on income if they are used to increase investment, yet they could equally have a negative 
income effect if they are spent to finance consumption (inducing a real exchange rate appreciation) or 
lead to a reduction in labor supply because of positive wealth effects.
2 The empirical literature on 
remittances is well aware of this simultaneity problem and has addressed it using instrumental variables 
techniques.
3  However, a second key issue when dealing with identifying the causal relationship 
between transitory income shocks and remittances that has not received sufficient attention in the 
literature is whether the transitory change in income is due to a transitory change in productivity, or 
whether it is due to a transitory but abrupt change in the capital stock that could be the consequence of 
1 See http://www.smartmoney.com/news/on/?story=on-20110330-000243.
2 See for example Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006), Bansak and Chezum (2009), or Acosta et al. (2009).
3 See for example Yang (2007) and Yang and Choi (2007).
1events such as natural disasters or wars. The reason why this distinction matters is that basic economic 
theory tells us that beyond the transitory change in income, it is the marginal product of capital that is 
relevant for the decision to send remittances if these remittances are driven by an investment motive. If 
the remittances are on the other hand driven by an insurance motive, then it is solely the transitory 
nature of the income shock that matters. At the macroeconomic level, there are events (for example, 
natural disasters or wars) where a decrease in income may be associated with an increase in the 
marginal product of capital. Observing an average within-country relationship between transitory 
income   changes   and   remittances   does   not   allow   to   distinguish,   therefore,   whether   at   the 
macroeconomic level remittances are driven by an investment, an insurance motive, or both.
4
The starting point of our empirical analysis of Sub-Saharan African countries is that year-to-
year variation in rainfall is a shock to agricultural productivity. According to the World Development 
Indicators (2010), the average share of agriculture in value added is about one third in the Sub-Saharan 
African countries. Hence, year-to-year variation in rainfall can have large effects on aggregate incomes 
per capita and on the return to capital, that do not go in opposite directions, through rainfall's effect on 
agricultural productivity. Moreover, year-to-year variation in rainfall is a plausibly exogenous shock to 
Sub-Saharan African economies that is of highly transitory nature: the sample average AR(1) 
4 To see this formally, consider an economy operating under a simple constant returns to scale production function 
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MPK  and hence the incentives to send remittances 
in order to exploit higher returns. A positive average response of remittances to negative changes in income can 
therefore be consistent with both, an insurance and an investment motive. However, an estimation approach that uses an 
exogenous variable which does not affect income and the return to capital in opposite ways can overcome this problem.
2coefficient on rainfall is about 0.18 and a distributed lag model shows that the significant effect on 
income per capita vanishes after about one year. 
Our panel fixed effects analysis that uses the within-country variation in remittances and rainfall 
yields two main results. First, year-to-year variations in rainfall have on average an insignificant 
contemporaneous effect on remittances to Sub-Saharan African countries. This result is robust to 
controlling for country and year fixed effects, country-specific linear time trends, as well as the 
exclusion of extreme rainfall observations (i.e. droughts and floods), a distributed lag model that allows 
to distinguish short-run from medium/long-run responses, and a dynamic panel data model that controls 
for adjustment dynamics in remittances.
Our second main finding is that the marginal effect of transitory rainfall driven income shocks 
on remittances significantly varies across Sub-Saharan African countries' GDP share of domestic 
credit to the private sector. This difference in marginal effects is so strong that at high levels of credit to 
the private sector transitory increases in income had a significant negative effect on remittances. Hence, 
while in countries with low domestic private capital remittances responded significantly positively to 
transitory income shocks, in countries where domestic private capital as a share of GDP was relatively 
high the remittance flow response was significantly negative. 
One possible interpretation of our findings is that they are consistent with an investment motive 
of remittance flows. The reason is that, if farmers' ability to obtain finance is a function of their wealth 
then a positive rainfall shock that increases farmers' income will slacken finance constraints and lead to 
an increase in investment. Therefore, when domestic capital to the private sector is thin, so that the 
percentage share of domestic private sector finance for each investment project is small and the 
percentage share of remittance finance is relatively large, a positive rainfall shock that increases 
investment will induce a particularly large remittance response (which, according to the investment 
motive, has the purpose to partially finance investment projects). On the other hand, as the percentage 
3share of domestic private sector finance increases, the role of remittances in exploiting domestic 
investment opportunities diminishes. Thus, an increase in domestic finance to the private sector makes 
it less likely that the observed remittance flow response behaves as if it follows an investment motive. 
Given this interpretation of why domestic credit to the private sector plays an important role in 
shaping the effect of rainfall on remittance flows, it is important to note that our findings are not 
inconsistent with the presence of an insurance motive of remittances. This is because in Sub-Saharan 
African countries with relatively high domestic credit to the private sector (where the investment 
motive should be less relevant as argued above) we find that the remittance response is significantly 
negative. Hence, in Sub-Saharan African countries where investors have relatively good access to 
credit, the obtained remittance response to exogenous rainfall shocks is consistent with an insurance 
motive of remittance flows. 
There exist several papers on the determinants of remittances that are related to our study. 
Using a sample of middle and low income countries and focusing on cross-country variation Freund 
and Spatafora (2008) show that remittances are significantly lower in countries where transaction costs 
are higher. Sayan (2006) investigates the business-cycle behavior of remittances for 12 developing 
countries and fails to find strong evidence for a significant average countercyclical relationship. 
Sayan's study does not use exogenous, transitory rainfall shocks to examine the effects that within-
country changes in income have on remittances however. On the other hand, Yang (2007) documents 
that exogenous income shocks due to hurricanes lead to a significant increase in workers' remittances to 
poor countries. 
Yang's (2007) study and focus on hurricanes is closely related to our focus on rainfall driven 
income shocks. This is because hurricanes, like rainfall, are a transitory shock to income. However, a 
crucial difference between rainfall and hurricanes is that the later has a large negative (destruction) 
effect on the economy's capital stock. This means that an analysis that uses hurricanes as an exogenous, 
4negative transitory income shock to examine the insurance motive of remittances is problematic 
because the response can also be consistent with an investment motive since the hurricane may be 
associated with a higher, transitory return to capital. A further key difference between our study and 
Yang (2007) is that Yang (2007) does not focus on the role of cross-country differences in financial 
development. In light of our focus on these cross-country differences, it is important to note that the 
negative relationship between rainfall and remittances, that Yang and Choi (2007) document in their 
micro-data study of the Philippines during July 1997 to October 1998, is consistent with our second 
main finding that at relatively high levels of the GDP share of domestic credit to the private sector the 
relationship between rainfall and remittances is significantly negative.
5 
There are a number of reasons why our empirical analysis focuses on the group of Sub-Saharan 
African countries. First, recent research on the macroeconomic effects of rainfall on income has shown 
that the significant effects of rainfall on GDP per capita are limited to the Sub-Saharan African region 
(see for example Barrios et al. 2010). That is, for other regions such as Asia and Latin America there is 
no significant average effect of rainfall on aggregate income. Second, according to PWT and WDI data 
the average ratio of remittance flows over total investment is about one-quarter in these economies. 
This suggests that remittances flows could be an important source of finance for the group of Sub-
Saharan African countries.
6 Third, there is a significant policy debate on the causes of Sub-Saharan 
Africa's poor growth performance when measured over the past half century. Part of this debate has 
recently considered the role of remittances in reducing poverty in the Sub-Saharan African region (see, 
5 According to WDI (2010), the average ratio of private sector credit to GDP in the Philippines during the 1997-1998 
period was 0.58. Plugging this value into our estimates yields a negative relationship between rainfall and remittances 
that is significant at the 5 percent level. Thus, our macro panel data results are consistent with the micro panel data 
evidence that is provided by Yang and Choi (2007) on rainfall and remittances in the Philippines.
6 According to WDI (2010), in 2007 the total volume of remittances flows to Sub-Saharan African countries was US$18.6 
billion; US$63.3 billion for Latin American countries, US$133.8 billion for South-East Asian countries; and US$33.4 
for Middle East and North African countries. While Sub-Saharan Africa thus plays a more minor part in terms of the 
total global flow of remittances, this does not mean that for the Sub-Saharan African region remittance flows are an 
unimportant source of finance. To the contrary, the 2007 GDP share of remittances for Sub-Saharan Africa was 2.4 
percent, 1.7 percent for Latin America, 0.7 percent for East Asia and the Pacific, 4.4 percent for South Asia; and 2.2 
percent for the Middle East and North Africa.
5for example, Gupta et al., 2009).
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we explain our estimation 
strategy and data. In Section 3 we discuss our main empirical results. In Section 4 we conclude.
2. Data and Estimation Strategy
We examine the reduced-form effects that rainfall has on real workers' remittances per capita by 
estimating the following model:
ln(Remittancesit) = αi + βt + γit + ηln(Rainfallit) + uit 
where αi are country fixed effects, γit are country-specific linear time trends, and βt are year fixed 
effects. uit is an error term that is clustered at the country level. 
As a baseline regression, we estimate the average marginal impact effect η that rainfall has on 
remittances. We then examine how the marginal effect of rainfall on remittances varies as a function of 
cross-country differences in financial development by estimating an interaction model of the form:
ln(Remittancesit) = ai + bt +cit+ dln(Rainfallit) +eln(Rainfallit)*FDit-1 + hFDit-1  + kit 
where FDit-1 is a measure for cross-country differences in financial development. In order to reduce 
concern that our estimates on the interaction effect are biased due to reverse causality of remittances on 
financial development, we use the time-varying measure of financial development lagged one year. 
Because this is a predetermined variable, it is less likely that the measure is affected by within-country 
variations in rainfall or remittance flows.
7 To strengthen this point, we will also report dynamic panel 
data estimates that control for lagged remittances on the right-hand side of the regression. 
Our data sources for the estimation of the above equations are as follows. The annual rainfall 
data are from Terrestrial Air Temperature and Precipitation: 1900-2006 Gridded Monthly Time Series, 
7 In our working paper, Arezki and Brückner (2011), we reported estimates that were based on using the average (and thus 
time-invariant) GDP share of domestic credit to the private sector. The estimates obtained there were very similar to the 
ones reported in this paper.
6Version 1.01 (Matsuura and Willmott, 2007). These rainfall data come at a high resolution (0.5°x0.5° 
latitude-longitude grid) and each rainfall observation in a given grid is constructed by interpolation of 
rainfall observed by all stations operating in that grid. The rainfall data are then aggregated to the 
country level by assigning grids to the geographic borders of countries. The annual investment and real 
GDP per capita data are from the Penn World Tables, version 6.3 (Heston et al. 2009). The data on the 
GDP share of domestic credit to the private sector and workers' remittances are from WDI (2010). 
Summary statistics on these variables are provided in Tables 1 and 2.
3. Main Results
Table 3 presents our estimates of the average reduced-form effect that rainfall has on remittances to 
Sub-Saharan African countries. Column (1) shows estimates where the control variables are country 
fixed effects only. Column (2) adds year fixed effects and column (3) adds country-specific linear time 
trends. The main finding is that the average effect that rainfall has on remittances is quantitatively 
small and statistically insignificant. Column (4) shows that this continues to be the case when the 
sample excludes observations that fall in the pre-1990 period (when remittance data might have been of 
poor quality). And column (5) shows that the effect of rainfall on remittances continues to be 
quantitatively small and statistically insignificant when we exclude extreme rainfall observations that 
fall in the bottom/top 5
th percentile of the within-country rainfall distribution (i.e. droughts or floods)
As a first piece of evidence that cross-country differences in credit to the private sector play an 
important role for the marginal effect that rainfall has on remittances, we present in Table 4 estimates 
that split the sample. Column (1) presents estimates for observations that are in the bottom 25
th 
percentile of the GDP share of credit to the private sector. The coefficient on rainfall for this sub-
sample is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Column (2) reports the estimates 
for the bottom 50
th percentile. These estimates show that in the sub-sample with below median credit to 
7the private sector rainfall had also a positive effect on remittance flows. The estimated coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level, but quantitatively it is less than half the size of the 
estimated coefficient in column (1). Moving to the top 50
th percentile of the GDP share of credit to the 
private sector, column (3) shows that the estimated coefficient on rainfall is negative in sign but 
statistically insignificant. A comparison between columns (2) and (3) shows that the marginal effect of 
rainfall on remittances is significantly larger in the sample with below median credit to the private 
sector than in the above median sample. In addition to this, column (4) shows that in the top 25
th 
percentile the effect of rainfall on remittances is negative and significant at the 10 percent level. Table 
4 is therefore a first indication that: (i) the effect of rainfall on remittances varies significantly across 
the GDP share of credit to the private sector; (ii) the effect of rainfall on remittances is significantly 
positive at low levels of credit to the private sector but significantly negative at high levels of private 
sector credit.
In Table 5 we document that similar results are obtained if we interact rainfall with the time-
varying measure of the GDP share of credit to the private sector (lagged one year). Because both 
variables on the interaction term are time varying we have to also directly include them on the right-
hand side of the regression. There are three main results worth noting. First, the interaction between 
rainfall and the credit to GDP ratio is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
Second, the estimates imply that at high levels of credit to GDP the relationship between rainfall and 
remittances is significantly negative. Third, the average effect of increases in credit to the private sector 
on remittances flows is positive though not statistically significant at the conventional confidence 
levels. 
Taking partial derivatives of the estimates reported in column (1) of Table 5 with respect to 
rainfall yields:
8This equation implies that at zero private credit to GDP ratios the estimates in column (1) predict a 
positive response of remittances to rainfall; and a negative and significant response at high credit to 
GDP ratios. In Figure 1, we plot this estimated relationship for the relevant sample range of the credit 
to GDP ratio. 
Column (2) of Table 5 shows that importantly the estimates do not change significantly when 
we exclude country-year observations that fall in the pre-1990 period. The coefficient on the interaction 
between rainfall and credit to the private sector continues to be negative and statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level. We also note that the standard errors on the estimates in column (2) imply that we 
cannot reject for any of the right-hand-side variables that the effects are the same for the post-1990 
period.
8 Column (3) of Table 5 also shows that the interaction between rainfall and credit to the private 
sector continues to be significant when we exclude extreme rainfall observations that fall in the 
bottom/top 5
th  percentile of the within-country rainfall distribution (i.e. droughts or floods). Thus, 
column (3) provides reassuring evidence that the estimates are driven by smooth within-country 
variations in rainfall and not by extreme weather events that could lead to an atypically large influx of 
remittances.
Previous studies of the effects of rainfall in Sub-Saharan African countries have documented a 
significant effect of rainfall on political institutions and civil war (e.g Miguel et al. 2004; Bruckner and 
Ciccone, 2011). To document that the effects of rainfall on remittances are robust to controlling for 
these within-country variations in political institutions and civil war, Table 6 reports estimates that 
8 In Appendix Table 1 we show that similar results are obtained if we split the sample into the pre- and post-1990 (1980) 
period. The coefficients are only significant for the post-1990 (1980) period, but we cannot reject for any of the 
specifications that the coefficients in the different sub-periods are the same. In Appendix 2 we show that, if 
measurement error in the remittance data is higher for countries with a low GDP share of credit to the private sector, this 










¶include the Polity2 score and a civil war incidence indicator variable on the right-hand side of the 
estimating equation.
9 The main result is that the effects of rainfall and the interaction between rainfall 
and financial development continues to be significant while these additional control variables turn out 
to be insignificant.  
A further issue is whether the interaction estimate between rainfall and the GDP share of 
domestic credit to the private sector is robust to controlling for an interaction between rainfall and 
cross-country differences in GDP per capita as well as an interaction between rainfall and the GDP 
share of agricultural value added. In the cross-section, GDP per capita and the agricultural value added 
share are positively correlated with the GDP share of domestic credit to the private sector. Hence, 
reporting estimates where as additional control variables we include interactions between rainfall and 
GDP per capita and rainfall and the GDP share of agricultural value added is an important robustness 
check. 
Table 7 shows that our main finding of a significant negative interaction effect between rainfall 
and the GDP share of credit to the private sector survives the control for such additional interaction 
terms. The estimates show that at low levels of credit to the private sector improved rainfall conditions 
have a positive effect on remittances while at high levels of credit to the private sector the relationship 
between rainfall and remittances is negative.
10 Moreover, the interactions between rainfall and GDP per 
capita, and rainfall and the agricultural value added share turn out to be insignificant in these 
regressions.
The interaction estimates use the time-varying GDP share of credit to the private sector, lagged 
one year to reduce concerns that this variable is affected by changes in remittances. In Table 8 we 
9 We obtain the Polity2 variable from the Polity IV database and the civil war incidence indicator variable from the 
PRIO/UPSALLA database.  
10 Appendix Table 2 shows that using in addition to a linear term a quadratic term of credit to the private sector yields very 
similar results. The interaction between rainfall and the linear GDP share of credit to the private sector is significantly 
negative while the interaction with the quadratic term is insignificant.
10report estimates that control for lagged remittances, in order to provide additional support for the 
assumption that the lagged GDP share of credit to the private sector is exogenous to contemporaneous 
within-country variations in remittances. Both the least squares and GMM estimates show that there is 
quite a bit of persistence in remittance flows. The AR(1) coefficient is about 0.5 and highly statistically 
significant. However, including lagged remittances on the right-hand side of the regression does not 
change significantly the estimate on the interaction between rainfall and the GDP share of credit to the 
private sector. Table 9 also shows that, when including further lags of rainfall, the GDP share of credit 
to the private sector, and remittances the contemporaneous effect of rainfall and the interaction term 
continue to be significant while the lagged effects of rainfall and the interaction term are insignificant. 
Table 10 documents that rainfall has a highly significant positive effect on investment. The 
coefficient on the contemporaneous effect of rainfall implies that a one percent increase in rainfall 
significantly increases the investment to GDP ratio by over 2 percent on average. The lagged effects of 
rainfall on investment are declining in size, and are statistically insignificant. Table 11 also documents 
that improved rainfall conditions are associated with significantly higher GDP per capita. The 
significant effect of rainfall on income occurs on impact; and the lagged effects are declining in size 
and are statistically insignificant. Hence, despite rainfall being a transitory ex-post shock to agricultural 
productivity, Tables 10 and 11 show that rainfall is associated with higher incomes and in particular 
with higher investment. Given these results, we provide in Appendix 1 a simple model that illustrates 
one possible reason for why the effects of rainfall on remittances are significantly decreasing in 
countries' GDP share of credit to the private sector.
 
4. Summary
We examined in this paper the effects that year-to-year variations in rainfall have on remittances in a 
panel of 41 Sub-Saharan African countries during the period 1970-2007. Our main finding was that the 
11effects of rainfall on remittances are significantly decreasing in countries' GDP share of domestic credit 
to the private sector. This effect is so strong, that at low levels of domestic credit to the private sector 
improved rainfall conditions have a significant positive effect on remittances. However, rainfall has a 
significant negative effect on remittances in countries with relatively high levels of credit to the private 
sector, suggesting that in these countries there exists a counter-cyclical relationship between income 
and remittance flows. Our finding regarding a heterogeneous effect of rainfall on remittance flows 
highlights the role of domestic credit markets in shaping the response of remittance flows to country-
specific income shocks.
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13Appendix 1. A Simple Model 
In this appendix we provide a simple model for why rainfall can have a particularly large, positive 
effect on remittance flows in countries with low credit to the private sector. 
The starting point of our model is that, if investors' ability to obtain finance is a function of their 
wealth (i.e. there are credit market imperfections that imply that only investors with sufficient wealth 
can obtain finance) then positive rainfall shocks can lead to an increase in investment. The reason is 
that a positive rainfall shock, by increasing investors' wealth, will slacken finance constraints and hence 
will lead to an increase in the number of investors. 
To be precise on the above point, suppose that a farmer wants to start a project of fixed size and 
cost I. He can obtain a loan for this investment project either from a local financial institution LDomestic or 
in form of a remittance flow LRemittance. In either case, the total amount of the loan is assumed to be less 
than the investment project. The simple inequality below summarizes this assumption: 
LDomestic+LRemittance=LTotal<I
The inequality implies that only farmers with sufficient wealth W>I-LTotal start an investment project. 
This inequality is a common feature of models with moral hazard, see for example Bruckner et al. 
(2010) and the references cited therein. The assumption that the total amount of the loan is less than the 
investment project is thus nothing more than a short cut to ensure that only sufficiently wealthy agents 
start an investment project. 
Again, for simplicity, suppose that wealth in an economy is distributed uniformly W    U[a,b]. 
The left-hand side figure on the next page illustrates how the distribution and amount of wealth in the 
economy affects the number of investors, and hence investment. Only farmers above W* have 
sufficient wealth to start an investment project.
14If the rainfall shock increases farmers' income, then there would be a right-shift in the distribution of 
wealth to a' and b'. This right-shift is presented in the right-hand side of the figure. As the figure shows 
there would be more farmers that start the investment project I.
11 The reason is that the increase in 
farmers' wealth slackens finance constraints and more farmers will be able to obtain finance for their 
investment projects. 
In order to illustrate in the above framework the importance of domestic credit to the private 
sector, it is useful to consider the extreme case where LDomestic=0; i.e. all investment projects are 
financed by remittance flows (note that still it is assumed that only a fraction of each investment project 
is financed by remittances). In that case where domestic credit to investors is zero, a positive rainfall 
shock slackens finance constraints for investors and this will lead to a large increase in remittance 
flows. On the other hand, if the share of domestic lending for each investment project is already large, 
then remittance flows will respond little to rainfall shocks (think of the extreme case where LDomestic=I). 
Intuitively, the reason for this result is that if domestic financial markets for investors are already 
moderately functioning the remittance flow that has the purpose to ease financing of investment 
projects plays only a minor role. Within this framework, the marginal effect of rainfall on remittance 
flows (via farmers' incomes) is therefore a decreasing function of credit to the private sector.
11 Note that the exact size of the increase in investment will depend on how wealth is distributed in the economy and how 








InvestorsAppendix 2. Measurement Error in Remittance Data
In this appendix we show that measurement error in remittance data that varies as a function of 
countries' GDP share of credit to the private sector (but not as a function of rainfall) does not lead to a 
bias of the least squares estimate. To see this, consider the simplest case where we split countries into 
above and below median sample credit to the private sector (as we do in columns (2) and (3) of Table 
4). In particular, suppose that in the above median group there is no measurement error, while in the 
below median group remittance flows are observed with error. That is,
(1)  R1=R1* (High Credit to Private Sector)
(2)   R2=R2*+e2 (Low Credit to Private Sector)
where the variable e2  in equation (2) reflects that remittances R2 in the below median group are 
measured with some error e2.  Suppose then that the true model is:
(3)   R1*=aRain* + u1   (High Credit to Private Sector)
(4)   R2*=bRain* + u2 (Low Credit to Private Sector)
Least squares estimation of equation (3) yields that: 
(5)  a
LS = cov(Rain*, R1*)/var(Rain*)= cov(Rain*, aRain* + u1 )/var(Rain*)=a
where the last line uses the standard assumption that cov(Rain*, u1)=0; (i.e. rainfall is exogenous to 
remittances).
Likewise, least squares estimation of equation (4) yields that:
(6)  b
LS  = cov(Rain*, R2)/var(Rain*)=cov(Rain*, R2*+e2)/var(Rain*)
                   = cov(Rain*, bRain* + u2 + e2)/var(Rain*)
                   = b +cov(e2,Rain*)
where the first line simply uses (2), the second line uses (4), and the last line uses the same assumption 
as above, namely that cov(Rain*, u2)=0. 
Therefore, even if errors in remittance flows are larger for countries with low credit to the 
private sector, this measurement error will not lead to a bias in the least squares estimate as long as the 
16measurement error in remittance flows is not a systematic function of rainfall. 
17Figure 1. Marginal Effect of Rainfall on Remittances as a Function of Credit to the Private Sector
Note: The figure reports the marginal effect that rainfall has on remittances as a function of 
the credit to GDP ratio (measured in percentage points). Results are based on the estimates 




















































0 20 40 60 80 100
Credit to GDP RatioTable 1. Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Share of Remittances in GDP (in %) 4 13 1 63
Share of Agricultural VA in GDP (in %) 31 13 5 55
Share of Domestic Credit in GDP (in %) 19 16 4 92
Table 2. Time-Series Properties




Ln(GDP p.c.) 0.95 0.192
ΔLn(GDP p.c.) 0.09 0.000




Excl. Extreme Rain 
Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)











Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Trends No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 899 899 899 506 798
Note: The dependent variable is the log of real remittances per capita. Huber robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the country 
level. *Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *** 1 percent significance level.




th  Percentile Bottom 50
th Percentile Top 50
th Percentile Top 25
th Percentile
(1) (2) (3) (4)









Country FE Yes Ye Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 217 442 457 217
Note: The dependent variable is the log of real remittances per capita. Huber robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the country 
level. Column (1) reports estimates for the set of countries that are in the bottom 25
th percentile of the GDP share of domestic credit to the private sector. 
Column (2) reports estimates for the set of countries that are in the bottom 50
th percentile of the GDP share of domestic credit to the private sector. Column 
(3) reports estimates for the set of countries that are in the top 50
th percentile of the GDP share of domestic credit to the private sector. Column (4) reports 
estimates for the set of countries that are in the top 25
th percentile of the GDP share of domestic credit to the private sector. *Significantly different from 
zero at the 10 percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *** 1 percent significance level.
21Table 5. Rainfall, Private Sector Credit, and Remittances
(Interaction Estimates)
ln(Remittances)









ln(Rain), t * Private 















Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Country Trends Yes Yes Yes
Observations 899 506 798
Note: The dependent variable is the log of real remittances per capita. Huber robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the country 
level. *Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *** 1 percent significance level.
22Table 6. Rainfall, Financial Development, and Remittances










ln(Rain), t * Private 























Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Country Trends Yes Yes Yes
Observations 899 899 899
Note: The dependent variable is the log of real remittances per capita. Huber robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the country 
level. *Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *** 1 percent significance level.
23Table 7. Rainfall, Financial Development, and Remittances










ln(Rain), t * Private 





































Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 853 899 853
Note: The dependent variable is the log of real remittances per capita. Huber robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the country 
level. *Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *** 1 percent significance level.
24Table 8. Rainfall, Financial Development, and Remittances








ln(Rain), t * Private 















Country FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Country Trends Yes Yes
Observations 855 855
Note: The dependent variable is the log of real remittances per capita. Huber robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the country 
level. *Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *** 1 percent significance level.
25Table 9. Rainfall, Financial Development, and Remittances






























ln(Rain), t -1* Private 







ln(Rain), t-2 * Private 







































Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Country Trends Yes Yes Yes
Observations 878 800 800
Note: The dependent variable is the log of real remittances per capita. Huber robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the country 
level. *Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *** 1 percent significance level.




















Country FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Country Trends Yes Yes
Observations 897 897
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the investment to GDP ratio. Huber robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the country 
level. *Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *** 1 percent significance level.




















Country FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Country Trends Yes Yes
Observations 897 897
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the log of real GDP per capita. Huber robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the 
country level. *Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *** 1 percent significance level.
28Appendix Table 1. Different Time Periods
ln(Remittances)
Post-1990 Post-1980 Pre-1990 Pre-1980
(1) (2) (3) (4)





























Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 506 791 393 108
Note: The dependent variable is the log of real remittances per capita. Huber robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the country 
level. *Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *** 1 percent significance level.
29Appendix Table 2. Quadratic Interaction Term
ln(Remittances)

















ln(Rain), t * Private Credit 























Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Country Trends Yes Yes Yes
Observations 899 506 798
Note: The dependent variable is the log of real remittances per capita. Huber robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the country 
level. *Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *** 1 percent significance level.
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